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Sudan's Genocide: Punishment Before
Prevention
Toby N. Jack*
I.

Introduction

In 2004, the situation in Darfur, Sudan was described as the "worst
humanitarian crisis in the world... ."' More than two million people
have been affected by the ongoing conflicts between the Government of
Sudan and rebel groups.2 More than 1.2 million people have been
internally displaced 3 and more than 200,000 have fled to the neighboring
country of Chad.4 Mortality rates suggested that more than 300,000
people would die due to restrictions on humanitarian aid by the end of
2004.'
These statistics have caused the international community to
investigate whether the events in Darfur suggest that the Sudanese
Government has committed the international crime of genocide. 6 The
U.N. and the U.S. have both responded to this question. The U.N. has
stated that the Sudanese Government's actions do not rise to the level of
genocide.8 The United States, however, through Secretary-General Colin
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2006; B.A., Brigham Young University, 2003. I would like to thank
Professor Tiyanjana Maluwa for his insight and my wife Leah for her support.
1. Kristin Nwazota, The Origins of the Darfur Crisis, PBS, June 29, 2004, at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/darfur/origins.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2005).
2. U.S. Department of State, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur, State Publication
11182, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research(Sept. 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
36028.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2005) [hereinafter State Publication 11182].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Testimony of Roger Winters, Assistant Administrator Bureau of Democracy,
Conflicts, and Humanitarian
Assistance (June
15,
2004), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2004/ty040615-l.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2005)
(offered before the Committee on Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on
Africa, United States Senate) [hereinafter Testimony of Roger Winters].
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. Id.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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Powell, has stated that Sudan's actions do constitute genocide. 9 Despite
these conflicting interpretations of the surrounding events in Darfur, both
the U.N. and the U.S. chose to refrain from sending military aid to
directly end the conflict.°
The evidence suggests that genocide has indeed occurred in
Darfur." The U.N. has not correctly interpreted the events surrounding
the Darfur crisis and has therefore failed to "prevent"' 12 genocide from
occurring. 13 While the U.S. has interpreted the surrounding events in
Darfur correctly, it too has failed to act in accordance with the Genocide
Convention to "prevent" 14 or stop the perpetrators of genocide. 15
Part II of this paper will discuss the historical background of the
Genocide Convention as well as those events leading up to the crises in
Sudan. Part III will discuss the elements of the crime of genocide,
including its original interpretation, recent interpretation, and its
application to the surrounding events in Sudan. Part IV will discuss how
the U.N. and U.S. have interpreted the situation in Sudan and how their
actions fail to conform to the Genocide Convention. Finally, Part V will
conclude by suggesting that the U.N.'s five-point action plan should be
utilized and that U.N. reforms will be needed to carry out this plan to
fruition.
II.

Historical Background

A.

The Road to a Convention on Genocide

In 1944, Raphael Lemkin coined the word "genocide" in his book
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. 16 He derived the term from the Greek
word genos meaning "race" or "tribe" and the Latin word cide, meaning
"killing."' 17 However, for much
of history genocide was referred to as
18
the "crime without a name."'
The early events of the twentieth century are littered with examples

9. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
10. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, D.
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
13. See discussion infra Part IVA.
14. Genocide Convention art. 1, supra note 12.
15. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, D.
16.
17.

RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944).
LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 7

(1991).
18.

WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2000).
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of this once nameless crime: South-West Africa,19 Armenia,2 0 UkraineE1
and Europe's Holocaust.22 These tragedies were the primary impetus for
the Genocide Convention in 1948.23
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention declares its purpose: "The
Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish., 24 Despite the ratification of the
Genocide Convention, genocide has allegedly occurred throughout the
world in Africa, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Paraguay, Brazil, India,

19. See generally Jon Bridgman & Leslie J. Worley, CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYE
WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS 4 (Samuel Totten et al., 1997). In the
beginning of 1904, a local German commander (von Trotha) in South-West Africa grew
tired of the Hereros, members of the Bantu tribe in South-West Africa. See generally,
Jon Bridgman & Leslie J. Worley, CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND
CRITICAL VIEWS 4 (Samuel Totten et al., 1997). The German commander, von Trotha,
ordered the removal and extermination of the Herero people. Id. at 15. The German
government eventually ordered von Troth to end the extermination, however, of the
80,000 Hereros; only 20,000 remained in South-West Africa. Id. at 3.
20. See generally Rouben P. Adalian, The Armenian Genocide, in CENTURY OF
GENOCIDE: EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS (Samuel Totten et al., 1997).
In 1915, the Armenians revolted against the Ottoman Empire because the government
failed to guarantee security of property and life. See Rouben P. Adalian, The Armenian
Genocide, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS 41
(Samuel Totten et al., 1997). In response to the Armenian uprising, the Ottoman
government developed a plan of deportation, execution, and starvation of the Armenian
population. Id. at 43. The plan was so effective that eight years later the Armenian
population had vanished from Anatolia and the historic West Armenia. Id. at 41. The
Armenian population was ultimately reduced from approximately 1,800,000 to about
32,500 people. See LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: IT'S POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 113 (1991).
21. James E. Mace, Soviet Man-Made Famine in Ukraine 79, in CENTURY OF
GENOCIDE: EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS (Samuel Totten et al., 1997)
(explaining that Stalin is responsible for the millions of lives lost due to famine):
It is now generally accepted that in 1932-1933 several million peasants-most
of them Ukrainians living in Ukraine and the traditionally Cossack territories of
the North Caucasus (now the Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Rostov on the don
regions of the Russian Federation)-starved to death because the government
of the Soviet Union seized with unprecedented force and thoroughness the
1932 crop and foodstuffs from the agricultural population.
See id.
22. See generally Donald L. Niewyk, Holocaust: The Jews 136, in CENTURY OF
GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS (Samuel Totten et al., 1997).
The Holocaust was the annihilation of nearly six million Jews. See generally id. It also
included Germany's annihilation of Gypsies, prisoners of war, slave laborers, and
disabled or mentally retarded Germans. See Sybil Milton, Holocaust: The Gypsies 171,
in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS (Samuel Totten
et al., 1997). See also Hugh G. Gallagher, Holocaust: Disabled Peoples 208, in
CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS (Samuel Totten et
al., 1997).
23. Genocide Convention, supra note 12.
24. Genocide Convention art.l, supra note 12.
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Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and other areas since 1948.25
Although members to the Genocide Convention have punished actors of
genocide on different occasions under Article 1, they have yet to invoke
the most important purpose of Article 1: to prevent genocide.
B.

The Road to the Crisis in Darfur, Sudan

Sudan has only had eleven years without major conflict since Sudan
gained its independence in 1956.26 The Sudanese Government and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement, also called the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLM/A), are the main parties to the ongoing conflict
in Sudan.27 The Sudanese conflict continues to be driven by selfdetermination, religious freedom, scarce resources, and political
inequality.28
In 1987, the ongoing conflicts between Arab nomads and non-Arabs
(the Fur) resulted in an Arab alliance of twenty-seven tribes.29 This
nomad militia became known as the "janjaweed. 3 ° The Furs, in
retaliation, aligned with the SPLA, 31 and continued to oppose the
Sudanese Government throughout the 1980's and early 1990,s.32

In 1994, the conflict intensified as the Sudanese Government armed
the janjaweed and enlisted their help against the Fur.33 The Sudanese
Government rewarded the janjaweed for their help by redrawing
territorial boundaries. The new boundaries took away centrally located
fertile plains of Jebel Marra in the Darfur region of Sudan from the Fur.
classes of people was the ultimate
The ethnic separation of different
34
result of this shift in boundaries.
Although these conflicts continued through 2002, the Sudanese
Government and the SPLA were successful in signing the Machakos
protocol,35 a Memorandum of Understanding,36 and a security
25. See LEBLANC, supra note 17, at 2-3.
26. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., Interim Strategic Plan For Sudan, 2004-2006, at 1
(Jun. 2003), at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan-africa/sudan/sudan-isp.pdf
(last visited Aug. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Strategic Plan].
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. ICG AFR. REP. No. 76, Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis, at 5-6 (2004)
[hereinafter ICG No. 76].
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id.
32. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
IRINNEWS.ORG, Sudan: Special Report III: Chronology of events (Oct. 4, 2004), at
http://irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=39682 (last visited Aug. 15, 2005) (giving a
detailed chronology of events surrounding Darfur, Sudan) [hereinafter Chronology].
33. ICG No. 76.,supra note 29, at 7.
34. Id.
35. See Machakos Protocol (July 20, 2002), at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/
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arrangement regarding humanitarian aid.37 Despite these achievements,
after the SPLA seized the southern town, Torit, the Sudanese
Government decided to break off all peace talks.3 8
In February 2003, the SPLA formally took up arms against the
Sudanese Government and took the position that the Government had
"marginalized and impoverished the Darfur region by consistently
favoring the Arab populations over indigenous Africans."39 The SPLA
also demanded a fair share of the area's oil revenues. 40 The Sudanese
Government, along with the assistance of the janjaweed, reacted with
aerial bombings and army attacks on villages. 4' As death tolls rose and
the number of displaced people grew, the international community was
forced to pay closer attention to the growing crisis in Darfur.42
III.

The International Law of Genocide

Regardless of whether or not genocide has actually occurred in
Sudan, the analysis must begin with Article 2 of the Genocide
Convention. The Convention includes acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
Article 2 specifically includes killing, causing serious bodily or mental
harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to
43
prevent births, and transferring children by force to another group.
Article 2 can further be broken down into three basic components:
groups, the actus reus, and the mens rea. Each of these parts can only be
sudan machakos07202002_toc.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005). The Machakos Protocol
permitted self-determination in southern Sudan and provided for the end of hostilities
between northern Muslim forces and southern Christian forces. See Paul R. Williams,
Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40
STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 359 (Summer 2004).

36. See Memorandum of Understanding between Sudan and the SPLM/A on Aspects
of Structures of Government (Nov. 18, 2002), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/
rwb.nsf/vID/BEC9263F8C34B20AC1256C7D004FB4A2?OpenDocument (last visited
Oct. 11, 2005). This Memorandum of Understanding addressed issues concerning, "the
structures of government, including aspects of power sharing, the judiciary, and human
rights." Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty
and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 359 (Summer 2004).

37. See Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period (Sept. 25,
2003), available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/sudan-security-09252003.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
38. See Chronology, supra note 32.
39. ICG No. 76,supra note 29, at 8.
40. Center for the Prevention of Genocide, Darfur, Sudan: Violent Attacks on
Civilian
Populations,
at
History,
at
http://www.genocideprevention.org/
darfur monitorl.htm (last visited August Aug. 15, 2005).
41. Id.
42. See Chronology, supra note 32.
43. See Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 12.
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applied to the events surrounding Darfur when they are combined with
an understanding of the original interpretation of the Convention along
with recent applications of international law.
A.

Groups

The Genocide Convention currently only protects national, ethnical,
45
44
Although included in earlier drafts,
racial and religious groups.
linguistic and political groups were excluded from the Convention.46
The Venezuela Representative to the U.N. explained that the "purpose of
the convention was not to protect any and every group; if that were the
case, other groups or workers, activists, scientists, etc., should also be
taken into consideration. ' ,47 After the Rwanda crisis, the tribunals made
it clear that the Genocide Convention was not a protector of individual
identities, but rather memberships of a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group. ' 4 8 Therefore, for genocide to have occurred in Darfur,
the Sudanese Government must have targeted at least one of the groups
listed in Article 2. The protected groups listed in Article 2, however, are
not further defined within the Convention. Therefore, a proper analysis
must include past and recent authoritative interpretations of the
Convention in order to determine if the victims of the Sudanese conflict
fit under the defined groups.
1.

National Groups

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in
Prosecutorv. Akayesu, recently defined a national group as "a collection
of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common
citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.' 4 9
The groups affected by the ongoing conflicts in Darfur include the
non-Arab Fur, Masaalit, and Zabhawa communities. 50 Even though
these groups share a legal citizenship in Sudan, along with the same
accompanying rights and duties, it remains uncertain whether minority
44.

Id.

45. See Secretariat Draft of the U.N. Genocide Convention, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947).
"The purpose of this convention is to prevent the destruction of racial, national, linguistic,
religious or political groups of human beings." Ad Hoc Committee Draft of the U.N.
Genocide Convention, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.1 to 28 (1947). This draft included as
protected groups: national, racial, religious or political groups. Id.
46. See Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 12.
47. SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 63.
48. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 521 (Sept. 2, 1998).
49. Id. 512.
50. See Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, Human Rights Watch, Apr.
2004, Vol. 16, No. 5 (A)., at 1, availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/Sudan0404/
(last visited Aug. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Darfur in Flames].
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groups within a nation meet the definition of a "national group" under
the Convention.' William Schabas, a legal genocide expert, holds the
majority view and argues that "[c]onfusing mass killing of the members
of the perpetrator's own group with genocide is inconsistent with the
purpose of the Convention, which was to protect national minorities from
crimes based on ethnic hatred., 52 If future tribunals, in Sudan, accept
this view then the minority status of the Fur, Masaalit, and Sabhawa
would not qualify as a national group protected under the Convention.
Although unlikely, a progressive tribunal looking to expand the
scope of "national groups" could find the authority for such an argument
in a United Nations rapporteur discussing the atrocities in Cambodia by
the Khmer Rouge.
The rapporteur suggests that the intentional
destruction of part of a national group may meet the definition under the
Convention.5 3 The issue, however, was ultimately left undecided.54
2.

Ethnical & Racial Groups

Although the Convention identifies "ethnical" and "racial" groups
as separately protected groups, tribunals have struggled to distinguish
one from the other.5 5 Generally, the term "ethnical" is broader and
encompasses more people.56 The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu has defined an ethnic group,
"as a group whose members share a common language or culture., 57 In
contrast, a racial group is "based on the hereditary physical traits often
identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural,
national or religious factors. 58
International observers have found that while non-Arab African
Sudanese civilians have been specifically targeted by the ongoing
60
conflicts, 59 the Arab Sudanese populations have been left untouched.
Conversely, a memorandum submitted by The European Sudanese
51.

See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 114-20.

52. Id. at 120.
53. U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 35th Sess., 1510 th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR. 1510 (1979).
54. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia, U.N. Doc A/53/850, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/231, at
65 (established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-1999.html (last visited Aug. 13,
2005) [hereinafter Report GEC].
55. U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. 3d Sess., 75"h mtg. at 115-16, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.75
(1948) (explaining that Egypt, Uruguay, and Belgium did not find any distinction
between the terms ethical and racial).
56. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 126.
57. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 513 (Sept. 2, 1998).
58. Id. 514.
59. S. 2781, 108 th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(8) (2004).
60. Id. § 3(8).
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Public Affairs Council (ESPAC) has taken the view that the "Arab" and
"African" distinction is not racial, but cultural. 6' Furthermore, ESPAC
does not agree with the view that the Sudanese Government is
systematically targeting one ethnic group over another.62 If this were the
case, then no protection could be offered under the Convention, because
cultural groups are not protected by the Convention.63
The contradictory findings suggest that politics can push one view
However, the Rwanda Tribunals have suggested that strong
another.
or
ethnic distinctions are not necessarily required.6 4 For example, the
Rwandan Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas all "share the same national territory,
speak the same language, believe the same myths and share the same
cultural traditions." 65 In Rwanda, however, the Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas
have been manually separated into ethnic groups through identification
cards.66 No such identification system has taken place in Sudan.
Therefore, if no ethnic distinction exists between the Arab and non-Arab
people of Sudan, then the non-Arab people may not qualify as a distinct
ethnic group.67 Thus, it is likely that a "battle of experts" will entertain
future Sudanese tribunals regarding this issue.
3.

Religious Groups

The United States' Genocide Convention Implementation Act of
1978 defines a religious group as a group of persons "whose beliefs,
doctrines, practices, or rituals" are "distinctive in terms of common
religious creed . .. ,,68 The ICTR, in Akayesu, has broadened this
definition as "one whose members share the same religion, denomination
or mode of worship. 6 9 In 1999, the U.N. Group of Experts for
Cambodia concluded that, "persecution by the Khmer Rouge of the
Buddhist monkhood might qualify as genocide of a religious group. 7 °
However, the Group of Experts for Cambodia distinguished religion
61. See Memorandum to The United Kingdom Parliament, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/uc67-i/
uc67ml 8.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2005) (submitted by The European Sudanese Public
Affairs Council) [hereinafter Memorandum].
62. Id.
63. See Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 12.
64. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-l-T, 34 (May 21, 1999).
65. Id.
66. Id. 35. In 1931, the Belgians issued identification cards to the different classes
of people in the country. Id. Since its inception, the identification card has become a tool
for discrimination among the different groups in Rwanda. Id.
67. See Memorandum, supra note 62.
68. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (Proxmire Act), S. 1851, s.
1093(7).
69. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 515 (Sept. 2, 1998).
70. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 129.
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from religious groups. 7' The extermination of religion would only
constitute cultural genocide, which was not included in the final draft of
the Convention.72 Specifically, the Convention requires the "destruction
in whole or in part," of a religious group and not the destruction of
religion.73
In Sudan, Muslims dominate the national government and make up
between sixty-five and seventy-five percent of the population.7 4 Those
that are non-Muslim are either Christian or belong to a traditional
religion indigenous to the area. 75 This distinction is important because
Article 65 of Sudan's Constitution declares that the Islamic Sharia will
be the basis for Sudan's legislation. 76 However, the non-Muslim
southern portion of Sudan has demanded and was granted an exemption
from Sharia law.77 The Sudanese Government has not extended this
exemption to civilians in Darfur, even though civilians in Darfur are
predominately Muslim and they regard themselves as "culturally separate
from the Arabs who dominate the Khartoum government., 78 Sudan's
media advisor has said that, "Darfur is in the north, so Sharia law should
apply. It is not negotiable. '79 In addition, the Sudanese government has
declared a "jihad' 80 against rebels not willing to accept Sharia law. 8'
While civilians in Darfur share different religious beliefs from the
Muslim populations of Sudan, their situation may only qualify as a
cultural genocide, which is not specifically covered under the
Convention, 82 because many Christians and non-Muslim followers living

71. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia, U.N. Doc. A/53/850, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/231, at
64 (established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-1999.html (last visited Aug. 13,
2005) [hereinafter Report GEC]; see also SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 129.
72. Genocide Convention art. 2-3, supra note 12.
73. Id. art. 2.
74. CIA, The World Fact Book-Sudan, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/su.html#Intro (last visited Mar. 23, 2006) [hereinafter WORLD FACT
BOOK].
75. Id.
76. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, Part IV, ch. 1, art. 65 (1998).
77. See WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 74.
78. Sudan Govt rejects call to separate religion, state, ABC NEWS ONLINE,

http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200410/sl231200.htm (last visited March 25,
2006).

79.
80.

Id.
Merriam-Webster

Online

dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=jihad

Dictionary,
(last

at

http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/

visited Aug.

22,

2005).

Webster's

Dictionary defines jihad "as a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty;
also: a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline. A
crusade for a principle or belief." Id.
81.

U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, International Religious Freedom Report 2003: Sudan,

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/23755.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
82. Genocide Convention art. 2-3, supra note 12.
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83
outside of Darfur have not been affected or specifically targeted.
William Schabas shares this view and asserts that a religious connection
is more difficult to show than an ethnical or racial one.84
Although the view held by Schabas and others will most likely
prevail, a strict interpretation of the Genocide Convention should not be
underestimated. The Convention requires the destruction in "whole or in
part," of a religious group. The conjunction "or" leads to the conclusion
that the destruction of every member within a religious group is not
required. It is unclear, however, what percentage or portion of a
religious group will be required to make up a "part" under the
convention. While non-Muslims in Darfur may make up a "part" of the
religious group, Schabas' view that religious genocide is difficult to
prove is correct.

B.

RequiredActs and Intents

The law of genocide consists of a physical element, actus reus, and
a mental element, mens rea.85 The purpose of requiring both elements is
to exclude acts that are accidental, committed without intent, or
committed without the requisite knowledge.86 For this reason, genocide
is a difficult crime to prove.
1.

The actus reus of Genocide

The physical elements of genocide in the Convention are found in
Article II (a) through (e).87 Each act constitutes genocide
under the
88
present.
also
is
element
mental
requisite
the
if
Convention
a.

Killing Members of the Group

The term "killing" during the Convention was not controversial
among member states. 89 The use of this term was first proposed by
Saudi Arabia in 194690 and was later adopted as the first form of
genocide by the Sixth Committee. 91 The Rome Statute 92 adopted the
83. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United
Nations Secretary-General, at 54,
516-22, 25 Jan., 2005, available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com inq.darfur.pdf [hereinafter ICID Report].
84. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 129 (explaining that religious genocide is very
easily classified as cultural genocide, which is not protected under the Convention).
85. See id. at 151.
86. Id. at 206.
87. Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 12.
88. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
89. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 157.
90. U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86 (1948).
91. U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 13 mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc.
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Convention's definition with only minor alterations. 93 The ICTR in
Akayesu, explained that the act of killing members of a group requires
two parts.94 First, the victim must be dead;95 and second, death must have
resulted from an unlawful act or omission.
In September 2004, the U.S. estimated that at least five hundred
deaths occurred each day from the crisis in Sudan. 9 6 The U.S. also
projected that deaths would escalate to 2,400 per day by the end of
December 2004 if international action was not taken. 97 A best-case
scenario would have produced more than 320,000 deaths between April
1, 2004 and December 31, 2004.98 Therefore, it would be difficult to
argue that victims have not been killed. 99
The second material element, death resulting from an unlawful act
or omission,100 was fulfilled by the ongoing actions of the Sudanese
Government. Specifically, the Sudanese Government had conducted
aerial attack missions, led deadly raids across the international border
between Sudan and Chad, and sponsored janjaweed attacks that have
directly caused the deaths of thousands of civilians in Sudan's Darfur
region." 0° The U.S. Government found that between January 2003 and
September 2004 the Sudanese Government implemented a "scorched
earth policy." This policy was carried out with both aerial and ground
attacks. The U.S. found that ultimately this "scorched earth policy"
"destroyed African Sudanese Villages, killing and driving away its
10 2
people .... " In contrast, Arab Sudanese villages were left untouched.
Under Article 2(a), the evidence supports the clear conclusion that the
Sudanese Government's unlawful actions have caused directly and
indirectly the death of many Darufurians.

E/AC.25/SR.13 (1948); see also U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 12
mtg., U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.12 (1948) (explaining that before the language was adopted
the language read, "killing members thereof').
92. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
93. See THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES & RULES OF
PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).

94.
95.
96.
(2004)
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.

See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 157-58.
Id.
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(13)(A), 50 U.S.C. § 1701
[hereinafter Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act].
Id. at § 3 (13)(B).
Id.
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T,

588 (Sept. 2, 1998).

See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 157-58.
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, supra note 96, § 3(11).
Id. at § 3(8).
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Bodily or Mental Harm

The second prohibited act that constitutes genocide falls short of
killing, but is still satisfies the elements of genocide. 10 3 The language
surrounding the "mental harm" 10 4 component of this act was debated at
length, unlike the 0 "bodily
harm" component, which "was affirmed
5
without difficulty."'
The International Law Commission requires that, "the bodily harm
or the mental harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a
serious nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part. 10 6 It is
unclear exactly how this should be applied; it is clear however, that rape,
torture, and inhumane degrading treatment could fall into the scope of
bodily and
Article 2(b).'0 7 International case law also suggests that
08
serious.1
only
permanent,
be
to
need
not
does
harm
mental
In one location of Darfur, leaders reported that Sudanese
Government sponsored attackers had raped more than four hundred
women and girls. 0 9 Husbands were often required to watch as their
wives were raped and then branded on the hand "in an effort to
stigmatize them." 110 While rape was not considered a crime under
Article 2(b) at the time of the Convention,"1 the international community
2
has appropriately included it within its application in recent tribunals. 1
While fear alone is not covered under Article 2(b),' 13 it may be a
symptom of serious bodily and mental harm. In Darfur, the men fear
on
traveling outside of their village so much that "many families rely
' 14
women to perform journeys because women need 'only' fear rape."'
The constant raids by janjaweed militias and the Sudanese
Government have produced broken limbs, dismemberment, and
disfiguration. 115 Many of these are the direct result of bombings on
103. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 159.
104. Id. at 160.
105. Id. at 159-60 (explaining that the mental component ran into some early
obstacles, but was later added by way of amendment with political pressure from India).
106. Report of the InternationalLaw commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth
Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, p. 91.
93
107. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61,
(July 11, 1996).
108. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 501 (Sept. 2, 1998).
109. Testimony of Roger Winters, supra note 5.
110. Id.
111. See discussion infra Part III.B. i.b.
521 (Sept. 2, 1998); see also Prosecutor v.
112. See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T,
Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-l-T, 108 (May 21, 1999); see also Schabas, supra
note 18, at 161-60.
113. See Genocide Convention art. 2(b), supra note 12.
114. Id.
115. See Darfur in Flames, supra note 51.
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villages believed to hold members of the SPLA. 1 6 Human rights
organizations continue to fill reports with evidence of serious physical
and mental crimes against civilians.' 17 Systematic bombings along with
constant beatings and rapes in Darfur have caused both serious bodily
and mental injuries that violate Article 2(b) of the Convention.118
c.

Conditions of Life

Member states of the Convention wanted not only to punish acts
that eliminated the existence of a specific group, but also the conditions
that would bring about physical destruction of that group.' 19 Article 2(c)
was specifically included in the convention due to the conditions
11.120
inflicted upon Jews in Nazi concentration camps during World War
The Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda
interpreted Section 2(c) to include the subjection of "a group of people to
a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of
In
essential medical services below minimum requirement[s]. '' 2
addition, the Rome Statute explains that "[t]he term 'conditions of life'
may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate deprivation of
resources indispensable for survival,122such as food or medical services, or
systematic expulsion from homes."'
116. Id. at 17.
117. Id. at 29. Human Rights Watch has reported that, "one eighteen-year-old girl
was assaulted by the Janjaweed who inserted a knife in her vagina, saying 'You get this
because you are black."' Id. Other reports indicate that a routine punishment is to cut the
breasts of women or to give parents the choice "whether they would prefer their children
were shot or thrown in the fire." Id.
118. See Genocide Convention art. 2(b), supra note 12.
119. Draft Articles for the Inclusion in the Convention on Genocide Proposed by the
Delegation of China on April 16, 1948, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.25/9 (1948).
th
th
120. U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 6 Sess., 4 mtg., at 14, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.SR.4 (1948). France offered the following example:
[T]he ghetto, where the Jews were confined in conditions which, either by
starvation or by illness accompanied by the absence of medical care, led to their
extinction, must certainly be regarded as an instrument of genocide. If any
group were placed on rations so short as to make its extinction inevitable,
merely because it belonged to a certain nationality, race or religion, the fact
would also come under the category of genocidal crime.
Id.
121. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 506.
122.

THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES & RULES OF

PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE 51-52 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (explaining that the Rome statute
used the reasoning in the ICTR Judgment in Akayesu to expand the meaning of the term
"conditions of life" which was placed in a footnote rather than the actual text of the
statute). Despite these useful interpretations, courts have failed to sufficiently define the
term "calculated." Id. at 52. Therefore, it will be up to future courts to determine
whether conditions "calculated" to bring about the physical destruction of the group, in
whole or in part are a mental or material element. Id. at n.41.
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The District Court of Jerusalem in A-G Israel v. Eichmann
distinguished the acts in Section 2(c) of the Convention from those 1 in
23
Section 2(a) and 2(b), reasoning that proof of results is not required.
The only proof needed is proof of the conditions calculated to bring
about the physical destruction of the group, in whole or in part. 124 If
results were proven, however, then the acts in question would clearly fall
into Section 2(a) killing, or 2(b) serious bodily or mental harm.125
Like the Government of Rwanda, 126 the Sudanese Government and
their sponsored militias 127 have directly carried out the systematic
128
expulsion of civilians from their homes in the Darfur region of Sudan.
This plan of systematic expulsion, according to the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees, has displaced more than 1.4 million people in
Darfur. 129 Of those civilians that have been displaced,
more than
30
200,000 have been forced to cross into Chad as refugees.
In addition to forced expulsion, the Sudanese Government has
knowingly contributed to the poisoning of wells, the plundering of crops,
3
and the destruction of cattle, all of which are vital to survival.' 1
Likewise, the Sudanese Government has supported the janjaweed in their
obstruction of humanitarian aid, including food, shelter, and medical
care. 132 More than 400 villages in Darfur had been destroyed as of
August 2004.133 Health is also a problem. 34 It is estimated that "one in
three children in the refugee settlements in Chad is suffering from acute
malnutrition.' ' 35 Roger Winter's testimony before the U.S. Committee
on Foreign Relations and Africa best describes the destruction and
conditions in Darfur:
The long list of destroyed villages manages to convey a sobering
123. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 167 (citing A-G Israel v. Eichman 36 ILR 5,
para. 196 (District Court, Jerusalem 1968).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 505.
127. Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, 50 U.S.C. 1701, § 3(6) (Sept. 9,
2004). "According to the Government of the United States and United Nations officials,
the Government of Sudan has engaged in an orchestrated campaign, with the assistance
of its Arab Sudanese proxy militia, the Janjaweed .. " Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 3(10).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 3(12).
132. Id. § 3(13).
133. Secretary Powell's Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
State Pub. 11182, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.state.gov./
g/drl/rls/36028.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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sense of the enormous scope of the violence and the crippling longterm nature of the devastation: in one village we know about, all
1,300 structures are destroyed; in another village, all 466 structures
are destroyed; in yet another settlement, 628 of 720 structures are
destroyed; and the list goes on. In some cases we know the names of
the destroyed villages, while in some other cases the village name is
unknown to us even though the destruction left behind is evident. In
village after village, the attacks by Jingaweit and GoS troops have
burned crops, killed or stolen cattle, and destroyed irrigation systems,
thereby devastating much of Darfur's economic base and potentially
136
discouraging eventual population return and reconstruction.
The key issue is whether these conditions were "calculated" to bring
about the destruction of these groups. The Sudanese Government must
have inflicted these conditions upon the people with the idea that such
conditions would cause their destruction. Perhaps the greatest evidence
showing that the Sudanese Government intended and knew that such
conditions would bring about the destruction of protected groups was
their consistent actions. Even when deaths started to mount, the
Sudanese Government did little to change its actions that caused the
conditions that brought about the destruction. It does not appear that a
defense of ignorance will be an option for the Sudanese Government.
Despite these findings, other reports suggest that the Sudanese
Government did not intend these disasters to take place, but that they are
only a result of civil war.' 37 In addition, U.N. officials have suggested
that the Sudanese Government has tried to make humanitarian assistance
available to its citizens. 138 Therefore, while the visual signs of Article
2(c) appear to be present, it may ultimately become a question of fact for
the tribunal rather than a question of law.
c.

Measures Intended to Prevent Births

Like Article 2(c), Article 2(d) was included in the Convention
because of the actions of Nazi extremists. 139 The ICTR in Akayesu,
interpreted the phrase "imposing measures intended to prevent births
within a group" 140 to include sexual mutilation, sterilization, forced birth
control, separation of sexes, and prohibition of marriage.' 4' It is
136. Testimony of Roger Winters, supra note 5.
137. Memorandum, supra note 62.
138. Id.
139. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 172-73. The director of the Auschwitz camp
was found accountable for sterilization and castration. Id. In addition, Ulrich Greifelt
along with his associates was condemned for sterilization and a range of other methods
aimed at preventing births. Id.
140. See Genocide Convention art.2(d), supra note 12.
141. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 507 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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important to note that Article 2(d) does not require the "prevention of
births., 142 Therefore, while the effects may be useful in proving Article
2(d), they are not necessary.1 43 In addition, unlike Article 2(c), measures
intended to prevent births do 44not need to bring about the destruction of
the group in whole or in part.1
Recently, rape has been discussed as a possible act under Section
2(d) of the convention. 145 It has been argued that systematic rape has the
potential to change the ethnic character of an entire population. 146 In
Akayesu, the ICTR explained:
In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined
by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to
prevent births within a group is the case where, during rape, a women
of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another
group, with the intent to have her give birth47to a child who will
consequently not belong to its mother's group.
While rape is seen as a physical measure that can prevent births
within a group, it can also be48a mental measure, which would also meet
the definition of Article 2(d). 1
It is clear that the janjaweed have raped victims during the ongoing
conflicts. 149 However, it is difficult to conclude whether the Sudanese
Government used rape as a mechanism to prevent births within a
In addition, while human rights organizations,
protected group.
including Human Rights Watch, agree that measures intended to prevent
' 50
births within a group are occurring, "few details are available."'
Therefore, until reports that are more accurate are made, Article 2(d) is
not likely to be a critical issue for future tribunals regarding the events in
Darfur.
e.

Transferring Children

The Greek government first presented article 2(e) in order to call
attention to a problem that Greece personally faced.'15 Today, however,
142. See Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 12.
143. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 173.
144. Id. at 174.
145. Id. at 173-74.
146. See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 1 507.
147. Id. 507.
148. Id. 507 (explaining that "rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when
the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a
group can be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate.").
149. See Darfur in Flames, supra note 50, at 29-30.
150. Id. at 30.
151. See LEBLANC, supra note 17, at 114. Greece wanted the world to recognize or
perhaps remember that communist captured thousands of children from Greece near the
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Article 2(d) seems to be more political than practical.' 52 Many critics
believe that it should not be specifically covered in the Genocide
Convention 53 because, "[e]xperience suggests that perpetrators of
genocide will not consider children of groups worthy of survival any
' 54
more than adults, yet the terms of the clause imply that they would."'
In addition, the terms "forcible" and "children" are ambiguous
and critics
55
have debated their limits without any decisive answers. 1
Recently, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities
Commission debated Article 2(d).5l

6

They faced the issue of whether

Australia's actions of forcefully removing aboriginal children to families
that did not share the same cultural characteristics constituted genocide
under Section 2(e) of the convention. 157 The Australian
Commission
58
concluded that such actions were genocidal in nature.
Like Section 2(d), at this stage it is difficult to fairly and adequately
evaluate whether there was a widespread plan to systematically remove
children in Darfur to another group. The Sudanese Government has used
the janjaweed as one of the main instruments in its "scorched earth
policy.' ' 159 Yet, even if the janjaweed had forcibly transferred children in
Darfur to another group, the Sudanese Government must have known
and intended for such a forced relocation to have occurred. 160 This is
difficult, because unlike Australia's direct actions in 1997 against
aboriginal children,' 61 the Sudan Government has not explicitly
demonstrated these types of actions. Therefore, like Article 2(d), Article
2(e) will probably receive only a small amount if any discussion in future
Sudanese tribunal decisions.

end of WWII. Id. These children were placed in European countries without a real
possibility of returning. Id. For Greece, by proposing Article 2(e) they were
"characterizing the problem as genocide," which was the most "dramatic way of calling
attention to" the problem. Id.
152. Id. at 115.
153. Id. at 114.
154. Id. at 115.
155. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 175-78.
156. See Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Bringing
Them Home, Report of the NationalInquiry into the Separationof Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Children from
Their Families, at 270-75,
available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/hreoc/stolen/
stolen.html?query=bringing+them+home%2c+report+of+the+national+inquiry+into+the
+separation+of+aboriginal+and+torres+strait+islander+children+from+their+families
(last visited Aug. 9, 2005).
157. Id.
158. Id.

159.

ICGNo. 76.,supra note 29, at 16-18.

160.

See discussion infra Part III.B.2.

161. See Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, supra note
156, at 270-75.
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The mens rea of Genocide

The mens rea of genocide consists of two components: knowledge
and intent. The text of the Genocide Convention requires that there be
"intent to destroy." 162 Therefore, negligent acts of genocide, if even
possible, are excluded from the Genocide Convention. 163 The degree of
intent required under the Convention is "specific intent."' 164 The specific
intent of genocide can be broken down into three parts. The actor must
intend to (1) destroy, (2) in whole or in part, (3) a national, racial,
ethnical, or religious group. "[I]ntent is a mental factor which is
extremely difficult, even impossible to determine."' 165 The Trial
Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia has stated:
[Intent] may be inferred from a number of facts such as the general
political doctrine which gave rise to the acts possibly covered by the
definition in Article 4, or the reputation of destructive and
discriminatory acts. The intent may also be inferred from the
perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators
themselves consider to violate the very foundation of the group-acts
which are not in themselves covered by the list in Article 664(2), but
which are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct.
The second component of the mens rea of genocide requires that the
perpetrator have knowledge of the acts. 167 However, in Prosecutor v.
Kayishema and Ruzindana the ICT for Rwanda concluded it is
unecessary for an actor to have
knowledge of every detail of a policy or
68
plan constituting genocide. 1
Although establishing mens rea is a difficult task, there is strong
evidence to argue that in the case of Sudan, it is not impossible. First,
the United States has reported that the Sudanese Government has
systematically attacked hundreds of villages. 169 Second, the Government
of Sudan has verbally declared a jihad against those unwilling to accept
Sharia law. 170 Third, the large quantity of deaths, destroyed villages, and
162.

Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 12.

163.

See

SCHABAS,

supra note 18, at 226-27.

164. Id. at 215-18.
165. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 523 (Sept. 2, 1998).
166. Id.
524 (quoting the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Decision Trial Chamber 1, Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, IT-95-5-R61 and IT-9518-R61, 94 (July 11, 1996)).
167. See SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 206.
168. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, 94 Judgment (May 21,
1999).
169. Testimony of Roger Winters, supra note 5.
170. Id.
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displaced peoples suggest that it would be difficult for the Sudanese
Government to effectively argue that it did not have knowledge that such
acts were being carried out.'71
Nevertheless, some reports continue to allege that there is not
sufficient "evidence of the deliberate intention to kill people of a specific
' 72
group," and to suppose otherwise is only "political opportunism."'
Despite this view, however, it is hard to deny that much like the
Government of Rwanda, the Sudanese Government "knew or had reason
to know that a large-scale massacre was imminent., 173 The following
statement by an official of the Sudanese Government strengthens that
conclusion: "Our priority from now on is to eliminate the rebellion, and
any outlaw element is our target.... We will use the army, the police,
the mujahedeen, the horseman to get rid of the rebellion."'' 7 4 Although
these words could be taken out of context, considering them in
conjunction with the Sudanese Government's actions appears to negate
such an argument.
C. Evidentiary Conclusion: The Sudanese Government has Committed
Genocide Under the Convention
The civilians of Darfur are a protected class under ethnic and racial
groups in the Convention. 175 Although some may argue that they are
protected as a religious group, to do so would prove difficult. 76 While it
would be complicated to prove that the Sudanese Government had the
requisite specific intent, the evidence does suggest that such an argument
may prevail under Articles 2(a), (b), and (c). 177 Yet, like past tribunals,

future tribunals of Sudan will most likely not focus on Articles 2(d) and
2(e) in their analysis. 78 Despite evidence that suggests that some of the
actions targeted Darfur's civilians only for cultural purposes, the
majority of the evidence suggests
that the Sudanese Government has
179
committed genocide in Darfur.

171.
172.
173.
174.
strong
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See discussion infra Part I.
Memorandum, supranote 62.
Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, para 94 Judgment (May 21, 1999).
ICG No. 76., supra note 29, at 16 (explaining that this statement describes a
correlation between the Government of Sudan and the actions of the Janjaweed).
See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 12,
(a)-(c).
Id. art. 2,
(d)-(e).
See discussion infra Part II.
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IV. Different, but Still the Same: Interpretations and Actions taken by
the U.N. and the U.S. in Response to the Crisis in Darfur, Sudan.
Completely uncovering and correctly analyzing situations that give
rise to genocide is a terribly difficult task. An international panel on the
events surrounding genocide in Rwanda experienced this difficulty
concluding: "[a]ttempting to produce a recognizable snapshot of
Rwanda in the year 2000 is no easy task. Data [is] poor, interpretation
wildly, much is hidden beneath the surface, and not least, the regional
conflict continues to have an impact on all other developments. ' 80 No
better description could apply to the surrounding events in Darfur,
It is difficult, if not impossible, for governments and
Sudan.
international organizations, such as the U.N. and the U.S., to precisely
conclude whether genocide is occurring while conflicts continue.
Supporting this conclusion is the historical verity that since its
ratification in 1948 the Genocide Convention has never been invoked by
contracting parties to "prevent" the act of genocide from occurring.' 81 It
180.

IPEP/OAU, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE 269 (2000).

181. Genocide Convention at art. 1, supra note 12. The U.S. has since placed
reservations and understandings on the Convention. See Declarations and Reservations
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Prevent
Genocide International, available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/
reservations/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
Reservations:
(1)That with reference to article IX of the Convention, before any dispute
to which the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent
of the United States is required in each case.
(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or
other action by the United States of America prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.
Understandings:
(1) That the term "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group as such" appearing in Article II means
the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group as such by the acts specified in Article
II.
(2) That the term "mental harm" in Article II(b) means permanent
impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar
techniques.
(3) That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a state's laws
and treaties in force found in Article VII extends only to acts which are
criminal under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state and
nothing in Article VI affects the right of any state to bring to trial before
its own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside a state.
(4) That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the
specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute
genocide as defined by this Convention.
(5) That with regard to the reference to an international penal tribunal in
Article VI of the Convention, the United States declares that it reserves the
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182

has only been used as a tool to "punish" actors of genocide.
Therefore, it is not unexpected that despite inconsistent conclusions,
by the U.N. and the U.S. regarding the situation in Darfur, both have
declined to take direct action with military aid to prevent further attacks
on civilians. 183 Instead, both have opted for political negotiations and
peace talks with the Sudanese Government and the SPLA.184 The actions
on the part of the U.N. and the U.S. have not prevented or stopped
genocide from occurring in Darfur, and therefore, have not fully
complied with Article 1 of the Convention.1 85 In addition, even though
Sudan's crises may not compare to the gravity of Rwanda's, genocide
did occur to some extent in Sudan. Hopefully the Convention will be
used to punish the perpetrators of genocide in Sudan, but even
punishment is uncertain at this stage.
A.

The UnitedNations Interpretation

In early 2003, the U.N. became concerned with the situation in
Darfur, Sudan. 86 At that time, Jan Egland, Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, concluded that
Darfur "has quickly become one of the worst humanitarian crises in the
world." 81 7 A year later, U.N. officials began comparing the crises in
Darfur to the Rwandan genocide of 1994.188

During that time,

organizations throughout the world began to ask the U.N. to declare that
genocide was occurring in Sudan and Kofi Annan responded
by stating:
"we [the U.N.] don't need a label to propel us to act."' 189
However, on September 18, 2004, Kofi Annan, under the direction
of the Security Council, began an inquiry into whether genocide was
taking place in Sudan.'

90

This inquiry found:

Hundreds of incidents have been reported involving the killing of
civilians, massacres, summary executions, rape and other forms of
sexual violence, torture, abduction, looting of property and livestock,

182.
183.
184.

right to effect its participation in any such tribunal only by a treaty entered
into specifically for that purpose with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Id.
Genocide Convention, at art. 1, supra note 12.
See discussion infra Parts IV.B, D.
See discussion infra Parts IV.B, D.

185.

Id.

186. The UN Responds to the Crises in Darfur: A Timeline, available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/dev/scripts/darfur_formatted.htm (last visited Aug. 11 2005)
[hereinafter Timeline].
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. SCOR, 5 0 4 0 h mtg., 12 (2004).
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as well as deliberate destruction and torching of villages. These
incidents have resulted in the massive displacement of large parts of
the civilian population within Darfur as well as to neighboring Chad.
The reports indicate that the intensity of the attacks and the atrocities
committed in any one village spread such a level of fear that
populations from surrounding villages
that escaped such attacks also
19
fled to areas of relative security. 1
Despite these findings the Commission in charge of the inquiry
concluded that the "crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be
missing; at least as far as the central Government Authorities are
concerned."' 192 However, these conclusions were not without some
doubt.
The Commission admitted that certain individuals and
Government officials may have committed acts with the required
genocidal intent.1 93 Unfortunately, the Commission felt that such a
determination could only be made by a "competent court" on a "case by
case basis."' 94 Therefore, it is not unusual that this inquiry has not
changed Mr. Annan's interpretation of the surrounding events in Darfur:
"I cannot call the killing a genocide even though
there have been massive
1 95
violations of international humanitarian law.
B.

The UnitedNations' Response

Although the U.N. has declared that the situation in Darfur does not
amount to genocide, 196 they are still bound by the Convention to
"prevent" genocide from occurring. 197 While the U.N. has not sent any
forces into the region to stop the conflicts, they have responded in other
ways, including: peace talks, 198 safe camps for refugees,' 99 a Disaster and
Assessment Coordination Team,2 °° presidential statements calling for a
20~
ceasefire,2 ° ' a signed
joint communique, 2002 and police training. 203 In
addition, for only the second time in history, the Security Council met in
Kenya to discuss the crises in Sudan and adopted Security Council

191. ICID Report, at 54, supra note 83.
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Memorandum, supra note 62.
196. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
197. Genocide Convention art. 1, supra note 12.
198. Timeline, supra note 186.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. The Sudan and the U.N. pledged to "alleviate the conflict in Darfur" with a
promise that the Government of Sudan will disarm the Janjaweed. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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Resolution 1574 which called for peace by the end of 2004.204
The U.N.'s actions have resulted in the signing of a peace treaty
between the Government of Sudan and the two rebel groups on January
9, 2005.205 Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary-General, stated,
This historic signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by the
Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement is an important milestone.
It heralds the possible
definitive end of a prolonged period of brutal conflict that has killed
at least two million people, uprooted four million more, and forced
206
some 600,000 to take refuge in neighboring countries.

Despite the signing of the peace agreement, the U.N. has remained
cautious, stating that, "[t]he real challenge now is for all the parties to
show the same commitment, determination and courage in fully
implementing the Agreement, which will entail equally daunting
challenges over a very long period., 20 7 Unfortunately, while the peace
agreement included the northern and southern parts of Sudan, it did not
include Darfur, where the most serious conflicts have occurred.20 8 In a
Security Council briefing after the signing of the peace agreement, a

representative for the Secretary-General stated that, "there could be no
question as to the priority task for 2005-the fighting in Darfur must be
stopped and the conflict must be resolved., 20 9 However, the violence in
Darfur continues.2 10
While the analysis presented in this paper suggests that genocide

has taken place in Darfur, the U.N. has made progress when compared to
2 11
past situations that have presented genocidal characteristics.
Unfortunately, the U.N.'s reluctance to act indicates their unwillingness
to use the Genocide Convention for both prevention and punishment.
204. Press Release, SC/8247, 50 80 th Meeting (AM), Speakers at Nairobi Security
Council meeting call for peace agreement in Sudan by end of year, available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8247.doc.htm (last visited, Aug. 11, 2005).
205. U.N. Press Release, SG/SM/9667, AFR/1091, available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9667.doc.htm (last visited, Aug. 11, 2005).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Press
Release,
SC/8290,
Meeting
5109
(pm),
available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8290.doc.htm (last visited, Aug. 11, 2005).
209. Id.
210. Id.
Now, however, violence was seeping into the camps and directly affecting
humanitarian workers. Armed groups were re-arming and the conflict was
spreading outside Darfur. December saw a build-up of arms, attacks on
positions, raids on small towns and villages, and increased banditry and looting.
New rebel movements were emerging and launching attacks in the area of oil
facilities in western Kordofan.
Id.
211. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3

C. The United States' Interpretation
On June 30, 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell was asked in an
interview why "the Administration [was] reluctant to call this
genocide? ' 212 Colin Powell responded,
Well, why would we call it a genocide when the genocide definition
has to meet certain legal tests? It is a legal determination. And based
on what we have seen, there were some indicators but there was
certainly no full accounting of all indicators that lead to a legal
definition of genocide, in accordance with2 13the terms of the genocidal
treaties. That's the advice of my lawyers.
However, Powell's response changed two months later when he
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.2 14
He
explained that after a limited investigation in July by a team including
the U.S., the American Bar Association, and the Coalition for
International Justice, "genocide has been committed in Darfur and that
the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility-and that
genocide may still be occurring. 215 Powell's findings were adopted in
the Senate with the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004.216
D. The United States' Response
The U.S. took many steps, similar to those of the U.N., despite
having affirmatively found that genocide was taking place in Darfur.2 17
The U.S. kept intact oil sanctions on Sudan in order to "ensure that the
Government of Sudan neither directly nor indirectly utilize[d] any oil
revenues to purchase or acquire military equipment or to finance any
military activities.28 In addition, the U.S brought the Darfur crisis
before the Security Council in the fall of 2003 and President Bush was
the first head of state to publicly condemn the actions of the Sudanese
Government.21 9 In 2004, the U.S. was successful in negotiating a

212. Interview with Colin Powell, U.S. Dept. of State, Powell Says Talks With Sudan
Government Yielded Agreement (June 30, 2004), available at http://usembassy.state.gov/
ethiopia/wwwh2504.html (last visited, Aug. 15, 2005).
213. Id.
214. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Colin
Powell, U.S. State Department, Crisis in Darfur (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/36042.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2005) [hereinafter
Powell Testimony].
215. Id.
216. See Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, S.2781, 10 8th Cong. (2004).
217. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
218. Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. 107-245, § 6(b)(2)(c), 116 STAT. 1505 (2002).
219. Powell Testimony, supra note 213.
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ceasefire, 220 facilitating the intervention of the African Union in
monitoring the ceasefire, 221 and, with the assistance of the U.N.
Secretary-General, obtaining a commitment from the Sudanese
Government that it would take affirmative and immediate steps to end
the violence and allow humanitarian aid to flow to civilians.2 22 Finally,
the U.S. played a major role in the signing of the peace agreement
between the Government of Sudan and the SLPA.223
However, the question remains whether the U.S. sufficiently acted
under the Convention after it declared that genocide had occurred in
Darfur.2 24 The U.S. did not send military aid to stop the conflict, but
focused instead on sanctions and peace negotiations in conformity with
the will of the U.N. While this strategy was neither quick nor efficient, it
did conform to Article 8 of the Convention, which states:
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide or any other acts enumerated in
Article 3.225
Article 8 gives the U.S. latitude to act in a manner that is most
226
appropriate for the situation.
In addition, Article 25 of the U.N.'s
Charter of states that, "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter. ''227 Therefore, the U.S. was bound to act in
accordance with Security Council Resolutions 1547, 1556, and 1574,
which did not include using an armed military to end the conflicts in
Darfur.22 8 Therefore, under international law, the U.S. can only fulfill its
full obligations to the Genocide Convention when the Security Council is
in accordance with the U.S. interpretation of the surrounding events in
Darfur.

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. White House Report, January 7: Sudan, Cabinet, USINFO.STATE.GOV,
availableat http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2005/Jan/10-786186.html (last visited Aug.
15, 2005).
224. Genocide Convention art. 1, supra note 12.
225. Id. art. 8.
226. See Genocide Convention art. 9, supra note 12.
227. U.N. Charter art. 25.
228. See S.C. Res. 1547, U.N. SCOR, 4988 th mtg. (2004); S.C. Res. 1556, U.N.
SCOR, 5015 th mtg. (2004); S.C. Res. 1574, U.N. SCOR, 50821h mtg. (2004) (meeting in
Nairobi).
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Conclusion

After the failure to prevent the crisis in Darfur, the global
community must ask: What can we do to prevent another tragedy like
Darfur from happening again? It is ironic that the U.N. gave the answer
to this question in its response to the Rwandan crisis. 229 Kofi Annan
proposed a five-point action plan that would prevent genocide from
reoccurring and which would satisfy the prevention clause of the
230 The U.N. must prevent armed conflicts, 2 31
Genocide Convention.
protect civilians during armed conflicts, 23 2 end impunity for the actors of
genocide,233 gather information earlier through a U.N. Special Advisor
for Genocide Prevention that can make recommendations to the Security
Council,2 34 and take swift and decisive military action when necessary.2 35
Unfortunately for the civilians in Darfur, the U.N. did not implement this
action plan before or during the crisis in Darfur.236 U.N. officials,
including the Security Council, must not be afraid to use the word
"genocide," they must not be afraid to act, and they must not be afraid to
use the Genocide Convention for its first asserted purpose: "to prevent"
acts of genocide.237
Although the U.S. applied the term genocide to the surrounding
events in Darfur, the U.S. also may not have acted in complete
conformity with the Genocide Convention.238 Its actions during 20032004 did little to prevent the Sudanese Government or rebel groups from
killing members of protected groups, 239 causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of protected groups, 240 or deliberately inflicting on
those groups conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
241
Yet, U.S. actions were constrained by
destruction, in whole or in part.
the need for Security Council approval. Without such approval U.S.
military action in Darfur would arguably have broken international
law.242 Therefore, the prevention of genocide may be an impossible task
229. Press Release, SG/SM/9197, AFR/893, HR!CN/1077, U.N. Kofi Annan's Action
Plan to Prevent Genocide (Apr. 7, 2004).
230. Id.
231.

Id.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Press Release, SG/SM/9197, AFR/893, HR/CN/1077, U.N. Kofi Annan's Action
Plan to Prevent Genocide (Apr. 7, 2004).
236. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
237. Genocide Convention art. 1,supra note 12.
238. Id.
239. Id. art. 2(a).
240. Id. art. 2(b).
241. Id. art. 2(c).
242. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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24 3
without reforms to the structure and operation of the Security Council.
Without such reforms, the remarks commemorating the 1 0 th Anniversary
of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda 244 may become meaningless:

We must never forget our collective failure to protect at least 80,000
defenseless men, women and children who perished in Rwanda 10
years ago. Such crimes cannot be reversed. Such failures cannot be
repaired. The dead cannot be brought back to life. So what can we
do? First, we must acknowledge our responsibility for not having
done more to prevent or stop the genocide.
Recently, hurricanes, tsunamis, and other natural disasters have
shifted the international community's attention away from Sudan.
Nevertheless, help is still needed there, and even more help is needed to
ensure the full utility of the Genocide Convention. Prevention has taken
a back seat to punishment. It is time for the international community to
recognize the order of these terms in the Convention: "prevention"
followed by "punishment."

243. See generally Charter of the United Nations, Ch. 5 (explaining the structure of
the Security Council).
244. Press Release, SG/SM/9197, AFR/893, HR/CN/1077, U.N. Kof!Annan's Action
Plan to Prevent Genocide (Apr. 7, 2004).
245. Id.

